Is This The End of the American Century?

This site features updates, analysis, discussion and comments related to the theme of my book published by Rowman & Littlefield in 2008 (hardbound) and 2009 (paperbound).

The Book

The End of the American Century documents the interrelated dimensions of American social, economic, political and international decline, marking the end of a period of economic affluence and world dominance that began with World War II. The war on terror and the Iraq War exacerbated American domestic weakness and malaise, and its image and stature in the world community. Dynamic economic and political powers like China and the European Union are steadily challenging and eroding US global influence. This global shift will require substantial adjustments for U.S. citizens and leaders alike.

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Monday, June 22, 2009

Russia Hosts and Promotes Emerging Power Groups



This month, Russia hosted back-to-back meetings of two organizations representing “emerging powers” on the global scene. The first of the two, both held in Yekaterinburg, was a meeting of the heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is made up of Russia, China and the four central Asian states (and former Soviet republics) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2006, Iran, India, Pakistan and Mongolia were inducted as observer states and expected to become full members soon. The presidents of the four observer countries, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, were all in attendance at the Yekaterinburg meeting. (When the U.S. originally applied for observer status at the SCO, it was turned down).

As I mention in Chapter 9 (“America’s New Rivals”), the SCO is nominally an alliance of “good neighborliness and friendly cooperation” but many observers see it as a counterbalance to NATO and perhaps to the EU. In 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed a long-term goal of turning the organization into a free trade area, reminiscent of the early phases of the EU.

The alliance already includes countries occupying three-fifths of the Eurasian landmass, and an expansion that would bring together China, Russia, India and Iran would be an imposing global force. Furthermore, it would bring together some of the world’s major oil reserves in Iran, Russia and the Caspian Sea. Some analysts see a strategic and economic effort among these countries to reduce the U.S. hold on the region’s energy resources. China and India, as the world’s fastest-growing energy consumers, may want to secure central Asia’s energy resources for their own economies. Iran and Russia, two of the world’s largest energy suppliers, want to reduce their dependence on sales to the West.

The idea of challenging Western (and especially U.S.) global dominance was evident in the communiqué from the meeting—The Yekaterinburg Declaration—which proclaimed that

“the tendency towards true multipolarity is irreversible. There is a growing significance of the regional aspect in settling global problems.”


Russia’s long-expressed opposition to “unilateralism” and “unipolarity” is a not-so-subtle swipe at the United States. Moscow’s preference for alternate configurations was evident in a second meeting in Yekaterinburg, right after the SCO assembly. This was the inaugural summit of the so-called “BRIC” countries—the emerging economic powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Russian president Dmitry Medvedev was perhaps guilty of hyperbole in calling the summit “the epicenter of world politics” but there is no doubt this is a formidable foursome. According to The Economist, the BRIC’s share of world output leapt from 16% in 2000 to 22% last year. For the last decade, GDP growth in the BRICs has outpaced that of the world, and of emerging and developing economies (see The Economist charts above). These four countries alone control about 40 percent of global currency reserves.

During the summit, the leaders talked about assuming more say in global policy-making; reforming the International Monetary Fund; and a plan to switch some of their foreign currency reserves out of dollars and into IMF bonds (an idea which is also the subject of much discussion in China). As the New York Times observed, the BRIC summit was
“intended to underscore the rising economic clout of these four major developing countries and their demand for a greater voice in the world. And Russia, the group’s host and ideological provocateur, is especially interested in using the summit to fire a shot across Washington’s bow.”

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Friday, June 19, 2009

Why is "The End of the American Century" Important to China?

Professor Ni Lexiong, who was the lead translator for The End of the American Century, has written this note, in Chinese, on how he came to know about the book and why he thought it should be translated and published in Chinese. The financial crisis, he writes, makes it even more urgent that people in China read the book.

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《美国世纪的终结》译后记


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2009-4-20 12:55:34 倪乐雄   来源:易文网

2008年11月中旬,上海大学历史系徐有威教授告知,他的朋友、美国巴特勒大学政治系韩孝荣教授向他推荐了梅森教授最新出版的《美国世纪的终结》,我很快与梅森先生取得了联系,得知这本书刚出版几个星期,在美国已产生一定影响。书中一些观点虽然也在各种文章中能够见到,但如此全面、深入、系统地探讨美国的衰落,并且观点十分鲜明的专著却鲜有见到,梅森教授的著作可谓弥补了这一缺憾。
在这本书里,梅森教授从一个宏观的视野描绘了美国正在历史性地衰退的图景。其理论依据是保罗·肯尼迪关于“帝国过度扩张导致衰退”的观点,这种观点提供的历史模式是:一个帝国为扩张和维持自己的势力范围,必然会把国力消耗在巨大的军事投入上,从而使国家首先陷入经济衰退,继而不可避免地导致政治和军事上的衰退。肯尼迪认为任何历史上的大国都无法回避这一模式,包括美国。梅森教授所做的工作就是试图证明今天的美国已经进入“帝国衰退的历史模式”,他的研究思路是沿着“国防开支——赤字”和“债务——经济危机——社会全面危机和衰退”这样走下来的。
美国“次贷危机”迅速引发了世界经济大危机,对目前和未来将产生重大影响,在这种时刻将此书译成中文,介绍给国内读者很有必要。因为今天的中国和美国似乎都已不由自主地来到了历史转折点上,秉性刚直的梅森教授非常了解自己的国家,并有独到的细致观察和慎密分析。他判定美国的历史性衰退已经不可避免地来到了,而且就是现在,美国政府和人民必须做好调整心态和姿态的准备。这一预言家式的断言,无论将来能否验证,都值得我们关注。
此书的翻译得到上海辞书出版社上官消波副总编和吴雅仙女士的鼎力支持,在征得梅森教授意见和上海辞书出版社同意后,立即开始了本书的翻译工作。具体分工是:倪乐雄序言、中文版序、导言、第1章,孙运峰第2章、第3章,南琳第4章,陈道银第5章,赵雅丹第6章、第10章,熊曙光第7章,王立中第8章,周晓华第9章。孙运峰负责全书的统稿和部分校对,吴雅仙女士负责本书译稿的校订和编辑工作。
此书的出版也得到渥太华中国事务研究院(The China Research Institute of Ottawa)和姜留义女士的支持,在此表示感谢。

倪乐雄
2009年2月18日于上海寓中

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Thursday, June 11, 2009

Federal Debt Approaches 100% of GDP

Even when The End of the American Century went to press in early 2008, the U.S. federal debt was reaching alarming levels, and was a central element of my forecasts of U.S. economic decline. At that point, the White House's Office of Management and Budget projected the gross federal debt to expand to $10.6 trillion by 2009, constituting 72% of GDP.

Since then, the federal red ink has become a tidal wave. The OMB now expects the debt at the end of this year to be $12.7 trillion, and to expand to over $15 trillion by 2011, which would then be (at 97% of GDP) almost as large as the entire economy (see chart).



David Leonhardt of the New York Times, one of the few economists to have been tracking and raising concerns about the deficits, writes that erasing the deficits "will be one of the great political issues of the coming decade." In his article "Sea of Red Ink" in the June 10 issue, he reports on a New York Times analysis of the composition of the debt accumulation over the last decade, "with the aim of understanding how the federal government came to be far deeper in debt than it has been since the years just after World War II."

The analysis finds that the growth in the federal debt since 2001 comes from four main sources. The first, the business cycle (especially the 2001 recession and the current downturn) is the largest component, accounting for 37%. Another 33% of the recent debt comes from legislation signed by President Bush, including his tax cuts. Another 20% derives from President Obama's continuation of several Bush policies, including spending on the Iraq War and the Wall Street bailouts. Only about 10% comes from new Obama policies, including the stimulus bill, and news spending on health care, education, energy and other areas.

Leonhardt sees little hope that the Obama administration can reduce or eliminate the deficits with "pay-as-you-go" government spending plans. The solution, he writes, "is no mystery" and involves inevitable tax increases and government spending cuts. These are political tinderboxes, of course, and pose a huge challenge to President Obama's leadership skills.

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Tuesday, June 9, 2009

The End of the American Century, Global Change and China


The following is a slightly edited version of my lecture in Shanghai on May 9 on "The End of the American Century, Global Change and China." The lecture was accompanied by a powerpoint presentation with much of the data and evidence I referred to, and the lecture was translated simultaneously into Chinese (see previous post on details of the forum).
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Perhaps it is no accident that the first translation of The End of the American Century is into Chinese, since China is the most prominent “rising power” mentioned in a book that is primarily directed at the decline of the one power that has been dominant for the last half-century. The role of China is also important because of the huge and growing size of the Chinese economy, and the multifaceted interdependence of China and the United States. In my book, I see raw military power as increasingly irrelevant both for the United States and for other countries, as the biggest problems the world is facing—climate change, environmental deterioration, pandemic disease, poverty, terrorism, etc.—are simply not susceptible to military solutions. Addressing those problems requires international cooperation. Such cooperation also facilitates trade and economic growth, which are keys to reducing the poverty and inequality that provide the breeding ground for discontent and violence.

I understand that most of you are involved in business, trade or finance in various capacities, so I will focus my remarks today on economic issues, at least those in the United States. Given the scope and speed of the global financial collapse, economic issues are, indeed, on the minds of just about everyone. The U.S. economy is a core aspect of my treatment of the decline of the U.S. as a global power—but it is by no means the only one. And while I do, necessarily, devote a lot of attention to economics, I am myself a political scientist rather than economist. What I do in my book, and want to do here, is to look at the varied and interrelated dimensions of U.S. decline. Because it is the symbiosis of all these aspects of U.S. and global change that makes the current situation so distinctive, even unique. Many analysts in the U.S. see the current economic predicament of the country to be similar to those of other economic downturns in recent decades. I believe the combination of U.S. economic, social and political decay, and the simultaneous rise of other countries in the world—like China—means a much different outcome and future for the United States.

For those of you who have not yet read my book, let me provide a summary of the overall approach. Keep in mind that the English version of my book went to press in early 2008, well before the ongoing economic collapse of the United States, and appeared in English in the fall, just as the scale of the catastrophe was unfolding. The essential argument of my book is that the U.S. has come to the end of its long period of economic affluence and global dominance. Most Americans—even, at last, the experts!—are starting to see the handwriting on the wall now, as we see collapsing around us the stock market, housing markets, job markets, banks, manufacturing, retail stores and news media. These are all interrelated, and driven by longer term problems that pressed against us before President Obama, and even before the disastrous administration of George W. Bush. The 20th Century, often called “The American Century” had already come to a close before the awful terrorist attacks of September 11.

America’s decline is a result of three convergent and interrelated phenomena: the deterioration of the U.S. itself—especially in the economic realm but in many other respects as well; the increasing influence of other global powers; and the changed nature of global interactions. The decade-long convergence of all three of these phenomena marks a global shift of historic proportions, and one that defines a much different place in the world for the United States and its citizens.

The central aspects of U.S. decline is economic. The federal government, the state governments, and most households have been living beyond their means for a generation, and the result is unprecedented levels of government, household, mortgage and consumer debt. Americans citizens spend and consume more than they earn, and the United States as a whole consumes more than it produces. This has posed a burden on the rest of the world that is unsustainable in the long run. I will come back to these economic issues in a few minutes.

The U.S. has also fallen behind other countries in many other areas where we flourished during The American Century. The educational system, once considered the world’s best, now ranks near the bottom among developed countries. Health care shows the worst results, on average, of any of the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The U.S. has higher poverty rates, more violence, and greater inequality than almost any other OECD country. Our roads, highways, bridges and dams—most built near the beginning of the American Century—are decrepit and in need of major investments. Even the country’s vaunted political system, tarnished by private interests, money and low levels of political participation, is no longer a model for emulation much of anywhere in the world.
While the U.S. has been on a long slide, both with our domestic health and our international reputation, other countries and regions have been moving ahead, and gaining confidence and clout. China is now the world’s workshop, and has the fastest sustained economic growth of any country in history. The European Union has brought together 27 countries into a peaceful and healthy community—an economic bloc bigger than the U.S. and with many countries more successful than the U.S. in providing health care, education and welfare to their citizens. Many other countries are increasingly prosperous, confident and assertive, to the point of challenging U.S. dominance in their own parts of the globe.

In addition, globalization has changed the rules of the game. Labor and capital move more easily around the world, making it more difficult for the U.S.—or any government—to control economic development. Organizations that span national borders—international and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, terrorist groups--are for good or ill challenging the power and influence of countries. All of this make global politics more complex, and less subject to the influence of single nation-states, especially go-it-alone ones as the U.S. has been for the last eight years.

President Obama is making noble efforts to bolster America’s global reputation and reverse its decline, but in my view, it is too little and too late. The rest of the world has already caught up or caught on, and is not much interested in the U.S. resuming its global leadership. Furthermore, what the world needs now, in confronting problems--of global warming, pollution, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, poverty and epidemic disease—is cooperation and compromise rather than “leadership.”

In my book, I buttress all of these assertions by using data, showing both trend data over time in the U.S., and data comparing the U.S. to other wealthy countries. In both kinds of comparisons the US does not fare very well. Let’s look at some of these figures, focusing on the economic ones.

The End of the American Century can be seen as a descendant of the 1985 book by the Yale historian Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Kennedy studied the big empires of the past—Rome, Britain, Spain, among others—and concluded that each of them foundered on what he called “imperial overstretch.” This is the tendency for big powers to become so “stretched” by foreign ventures, expansion or wars that they end up bankrupting themselves at home, leading to social and economic decay. Kennedy predicted in the mid-1980s that the same thing would happen to the Soviet Union, and even hinted that the U.S. was also vulnerable to the problem of imperial overstretch and debt. When he published that book in 1985, the U.S. federal debt was about 45% of the economy (GDP), which Kennedy said was historically unprecedented for any large power in peacetime. The only exception was France on the eve of the French Revolution.

But look what happened in the two decades after the publication of Kennedy’s book. The US federal debt mushroomed from less than half of GDP to over two-thirds of GDP. The problem escalated with the administration of G.W. Bush, who sharply increased defense spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while simultaneously cutting income taxes. When I wrote my book in 2007-2008, I thought the size of the debt was alarming, as it approached $10 trillion. But then the financial crisis hit the United States, the stock market collapsed (by half), unemployment skyrocketed, and Congress and the President approved huge financial bailout plans that sent the federal debt even higher. The federal budget of the new Obama administration, calling for huge new spending on education, health care, infrastructure and the environment (all vitally needed but terribly expensive), is sending the federal debt burdens to levels unseen since World War II. Within a few years, even according to the President’s optimistic assumptions, the gross federal debt will reach 100% of the size of the economy. I should point out that these huge debt levels do not even include the “unfunded liabilities” for Social Security and Medicare, which would add another $45 trillion. The government has put aside no money to pay for retirement and health care benefits for senior citizens, who will increase greatly in numbers as the “baby boomers” begins retiring in the next few years.

The federal government debt, though, is only one aspect of the multiple levels of indebtedness in the United States. Another aspect of this is the trade deficit. For most of the years since World War II, the U.S. maintained a rough balance of exports and imports. But during the 1990s, as imports soared and exports declined, the trade balance got seriously out of whack, reaching records levels in both absolute terms and as a percent of GDP. The huge increase in imports, many of them from China, helped the U.S. standard of living, but was not matched by similar productivity, output or exports from the US.

A third aspect of US debt—what some called the “triple deficit”—is household and consumer debt. Over the last two decades, Americans have built up record levels of consumer debt. The household savings rate (savings as a percent of household income) have always been relatively low in the US compared to other countries, but in the last twenty years have declined sharply. By 2005, this number had dipped below zero for the first time since the Great Depression. Most Americans have saved almost nothing for their retirement years, at a time when most employers are no longer providing retirement pensions for their employees. This presages a sharp decline in the standard of living, and dramatic increases in poverty, as the population ages. On this dimension too, the US compares unfavorably with most other wealthy countries.

The American propensity to spend rather than save is partly a culture phenomenon—the strong strain of materialism in U.S. culture—but also partly due to the increasing influence of the financial services sector in the U.S. in recent years. Manufacturing has declined steadily as a share of GDP in the U.S. The U.S. doesn’t actually produce much any more. Increasingly, manufacturing has been replaced by financial services. Banks and mortgage companies make money by getting people to borrow, and therefore go into debt. One small but telling example of this is the dozens of credit card offers that most Americans get in the mail. I get several such offers a week, for example. But so do many of my students, most of whom have no income at all! As a consequence, credit card debt is at a record high, and the average household has about $10,000 in credit card debt. Consumer and household debt overall totals about $13 trillion—the size of the entire U.S. economy.

The bottom line is that the U.S. has become a consumer society, consuming far more than we produce or earn, and this can not be sustained. Consumption accounts for almost three-quarters of GDP in the US—a record for any large economy in modern history. As we have seen, much of that consumption is fueled by debt. Americans will have to save more and spend less. This will entail a substantial contraction in the U.S. economy, as workers are laid off and consumer spending declines. Unfortunately, this will also mean a decline in tax revenues, just at the time when government spending is increasing. The U.S. stock market has already declined by 50% since its highs of 2008. The economy as a whole is shrinking, at the fastest rate since the Great Depression. Most economists think that this economic decline will bottom out fairly soon, and that the worst is over. But given the problems I have mentioned, I think it is possible that the US GDP could contract by as much as one-third—roughly the same decline that the U.S. experienced during the height of the Great Depression in 1929-1933. It took the U.S. economy about 4 years to recover from that decline.

U.S. economic decline is just one element—albeit an important one—of the diminishing U.S. power, influence and reputation in the world. Global surveys show little enthusiasm around the world now for “American-style” democracy, for the American way of doing business, or for the spread of US customs and ideas. People in most countries think it would be better if another country rivaled the U.S. in military power. And a recent BBC poll of people in 21 countries found many more believing that the U.S. role in the world was “mostly negative” rather than “mostly positive.” China ranked slightly ahead of the U.S. on this question.

At the same time that U.S. power and influence is diminishing, some other countries are growing stronger, more confident and more assertive. Possible rivals for influence with the U.S. include the “BRIC” countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—and also the European Union, which now includes 27 countries with a population and GNP larger than that of the United States. The “rising” BRIC countries have had very fast rates of economic growth in recent years and, at least until the economic crisis this year, were expected to perform even better in the near future. By another measure, the growth in stock market value, these rising powers are also outpacing the U.S. The U.S. stock market grew exceptionally fast from 2002-2007, rising at an average rate of about 15% per year. But each of the BRIC countries experienced stock market growth at least twice that of the U.S. in those years. As a percent of the world’s total stock market, the U.S. share has shrunk by almost half over the last thirty years.

Perhaps even more astonishing is the declining relative influence of U.S. banks, a phenomenon accelerated, of course, by the collapse of so many financial institutions in the U.S. Measured by market capitalization, a year ago four of the largest banks in the world were American. Now only two are. And four of the top ten are now Chinese!

These changes in the U.S. and the rest of the world signal a fundamental transformation of global politics and economics, and will require adjustments by people and governments alike around the world. For the United States and its citizens, these changes will be particularly wrenching. The U.S. economy will decline—probably by a lot, as will the standard of living in the U.S. For Americans used to a rising tide of affluence and spending, this will be a difficult adjustment. And it will also be difficult for Americans, psychologically, to deal with our diminished stature in the globe. Many changes are necessary to help restore America’s economic, social and political health. It seems to me that President Obama is cognizant of these needs, and is moving amazingly rapidly to address them. But the task is a difficult one, and a long-term one.

I am not really in a position to suggest what will happen, or should happen, in China. That is for you to decide, not me! But I was told me you would be interested in how I see all of this affecting China, so let me just mention a few things. First, of all, as should be obvious from my presentation, it seems to me that China is going to have to rely less on the U.S. market for helping fuel China’s economic growth. Americans will simply have to spend less, which means buying less of China’s many exports. It would seem that this would require, and offer the opportunity, for Chinese manufacturers to focus more on the domestic Chinese market, which will inevitably improve the standard of living of people in China. (This is an argument also made by Paul Krugman during his recent visit to China).

Even so, the U.S. and China both need each other for the economic health and development of both countries. And the rest of the world needs these two big powers to cooperate in solving global issues of trade, the environment, poverty, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, etc. So the interdependence of the two countries should continue and increase. China’s growing economy and international influence comes with increasing global responsibilities along these lines as well. China, for example, has now surpassed the United States as the leading emitter of carbon gasses that contribute to global warming. In my mind, global warming is the single greatest threat to the globe, and it requires serious work and attention. The problem can not be solved without the participation and cooperation of the U.S. and China.

Due to what has happened in the U.S., in China, and in the global community, China should by now certainly be considered an equal partner with the U.S. and other big powers in helping to shape this new global environment. I believe, from what your leaders say, that China is ready to play a bigger role in the world. And with a new, enlightened leadership in Washington, I am hoping the feelings will be mutual.

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Thursday, May 28, 2009

"The End of the American Century" Sparks Interest in China


A Chinese translation of The End of the American Century was published in China in April, just five months after the book appeared in the United States (see earlier post on publication details). The editors at Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House told me that they translated and produced the book in record time, because they considered it a "hot topic." At the National Book Fair in Jinan, according to the publisher, the book attracted a good deal of interest, and reached #3 on the publisher's sales ranking.

A conference related to the book's title was held at the Shanghai Exhibition Center on May 9, and I was invited to give the opening address, along with a number of prominent Chinese academics. The event was held in the Center's "Friendship Hall" (see photo) which seated over 1000 people. But the turnout was unexpectedly large, and a separate room, with sound piped in, was set up for the spillover. The organizers estimated the total audience at over 1300. While some of the audience were students and professors, most were businesspeople, investors and clients of a financial securities company that was one of the sponsors of the event. So they were especially interested in the U.S. and global financial crisis, and how that will affect the U.S., China, and Sino-U.S. relations.

From questions posed by the audience, and in conversations I had with academics, journalists and financiers, the reactions to my thesis of U.S. decline was decidedly mixed, and surprisingly similar to the range of responses here in the U.S. Some agreed that the U.S. was in serious straits. Others felt that the U.S. would remain (or even should remain) the world's dominant power. Some felt that it was China's turn to take a more prominent role in global politics and economics.

Shanghai itself provides a stunning example of how far and fast China has grown. I last visited the city 20 years ago, when most of the street traffic was bicycles, and before any of the magnificent skyscrapers had risen on the other side of the river from the Bund. Now the city center is as gleaming and modern as any I have seen anywhere in the world. The many downtown shopping malls, modern and airy, are filled with outlets of the most popular (and most expensive!) Western chains. The city's two airports are modern, efficient architectural beauties. The subways and trains are clean, comfortable and efficient. The world's first commercially operating "Maglev" train (magnetic levitation) connects Pudong airport to the city center, reaching a mind-blowing speed of 250 mph. The only real problem in the city, to my mind, is the street traffic, with the chaotic and dangerous competition of taxis, cars, motorbikes, bicycles and pedestrians (more on this in a later post).

In later posts, I will post more information on the Shanghai conference, with the text of my own lecture there, and information about the other presenters at the meeting.

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Wednesday, May 20, 2009

A Welcome Spotlight on Women's Welfare

Caleb Hamman
chamman@butler.edu

When President Barack Obama spoke at the University of Notre Dame’s commencement ceremony Sunday, much of his focus was devoted to women. In the weeks before his arrival, there had been considerable upheaval at the Catholic university due to Obama’s support for abortion rights, a position opposed by the Church.

The abortion debate aside, in a time when gender inequality continues to plague the United States, it is reassuring to see attention being given to women’s issues. Currently, the United Nations ranks U.S. gender development 16th in the world—a ranking exacerbated by George W. Bush’s eight years in office. His administration’s first attacks on women began early and abroad.

Immediately after coming to Washington, the Bush administration instituted a “global gag rule” on foreign organizations receiving U.S. aid. Under threat of defunding, the order explicitly forbade clinics from providing women with abortion counseling or operations, even if they wished to use their own money for the services.

The next summer, the Bush administration halted potential U.S. ratification of the Convention of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Although 185 countries have ratified the treaty, the United States—like Iran, Sudan and Somalia—is not one of them.

Soon after, the Bush administration cut off $34 million from a U.N. fund providing women around the world with birth control, sex education and maternal health care. It also began a fierce attack against the newly formed International criminal court—an organization promising historical gains in holding war criminals accountable for sex crimes against women.

The previous eight years also saw a decline in the welfare of women within the United States. In Dec. 2008, a national crime report was released revealing that the latter years of the Bush administration oversaw a 25 percent increase in sexual violence and a 42 percent increase in domestic violence. Soon after the report’s release, the White House imposed a new rule on Health and Human services making it more difficult for women to obtain basic healthcare or birth control.

Because women in the United States are disproportionately poor, the Bush administration’s unceasing attacks on social programs and progressive taxes effectively constituted an assualt on women's economic welfare. Accompanying Bush’s policy programs were overt threats to veto any sort of equal pay for equal work legislation.

Throughout its eight years in office, the Bush administration showed clear disdain for its campaign promise that “W stands for women.” As a result, the welfare of women in the U.S. has stagnated relative to that of other advanced, industrialized societies.

The Obama administration has taken some valuable steps to put the U.S. back on track toward gender equality. In January, Obama rescinded Bush’s “global gag” policy. A few days later, he signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act which advanced the campaign for ending gender discrimination in income.

Although efforts such as those of the Obama administration are valuable, they will need to be sustained and furthered if gender inequality is to be removed from the vortex of U.S. decline.

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Friday, May 8, 2009

Immobility Furthering Decline

Caleb Hamman

chamman@butler.edu

In a time of financial turmoil and drastic inequality, one would hope the American Dream to be functioning well. This notion, that hard work will bring success to anyone in the United States, has always been central to America’s ideological fabric. Despite such tradition, recent research suggests a need to reevaluate the accuracy of the American Dream.
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Ongoing work at the Economic Mobility Project (EMP) has been attempting to do just that. A nonpartisan effort funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, EMP has been conducting the most detailed research of U.S. economic mobility to date. Its findings, thoroughly concerning, strongly reinforce the arguments of The End of the American Century.
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Using longitudinal income data, EMP researchers find the United States to be a more class stratified society than commonly believed. Despite the popularity of “rags to riches” notions, the EMP finds that, on average, children born into the poorest fifth of households have only a 6 percent chance of making it to the top income quintile. Conversely, 42 percent will remain in the poorest group. More than six in ten of these impoverished children never become even middleclass.
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Similar mobility barriers exist at the top. While 39 percent of children born into the richest income quintile will remain there, only 9 percent will fall to the bottom. EMP finds remnants of mobility remains in the middleclass, although even these children are more likely to fall into poverty than they are to rise to wealth.
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The project’s findings are particularly disturbing in the areas of gender and race. Women, already suffering multifaceted disparity with men, are also less mobile than their male counterparts. Compared to these, it is considerably harder for women born into poor families to become wealthy. Similarly, it is also easier for wealthy women to become poor.
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The racial contrast is even starker. Black children are half as likely as their white counterparts to move from extreme poverty to extreme wealth. Simultaneously, black children born into the bottom income bracket are almost twice as likely as white children to remain there. Incredibly, EMP finds that nearly three in four middleclass black children will fall into poverty—a condition tremendously difficult for them to escape.
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As such findings suggest, the American Dream is not as dynamic as many believe it to be. In fact, U.S. mobility levels are actually lower than those of many developed countries. As the EMP reports, the two major international comparisons to date have placed U.S. mobility levels either last or second-to-last among nations analyzed (which have included mostly Western Europe and Scandinavia). As EMP’s authors put, “the view that America is ‘the land of opportunity’ doesn’t entirely square with the facts.”
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In light of the numerous economic, political, and social issues contributing to U.S. decline, the discovery of immobility is particularly troubling. As Americans become more economically and politically unequal, the stakes of socioeconomic outcomes continue to rise. That these outcomes are out of the hands of many is more than a contributor to The End of the American Century—it is an issue of fundamental fairness and a contradiction of one of America’s most cherished ideals.

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