Obama's Peace Prize, and U.S. Power, as Seen From India

The Nobel Committee's selection of President Obama for the Peace Prize is a recognition of the reality that U.S. power rests "not in its weapons or in its armies, but in the syncretic values of the American people." This is the view of India's M.D. Nalapat, a Professor of Geopolitics at Manipal University. Professor Nalapat's essay, "Peace, Not War, the Best Strategy" appears on the webpage of the China-U.S. Friendship Exchange as part of a dialogue on the themes of my book on The End of the American Century.

This response to Nalapat's essay appears on that same site this month.

It is both enlightening and refreshing to hear about the U.S. role in the world from a thoughtful critic outside the U.S., like India's Professor M.D. Nalapat. He points to the past tendency of the U.S. to rely on ''military and economic muscle to seek 'compromises' that are in fact surrenders by the other side.'' I believe those views are widespread in the world, though quite different from the way most Americans perceive their role in the world. It is difficult for Americans to hear the voices and opinions of others, because we are so used to thinking of ourselves as the world's best, and the most admirable. Kishore Mahbubani, the author of The New Asian Hemisphere, thinks Americans are blind to their own shortcomings, and basically unable ''to listen to other voices on the planet.'' In an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, this is one big factor in America's declining global power, influence, and effectiveness.

Mr. Nalapat views the great strength of the U.S. resting in its ''syncretic values'' and its openness to innovation and immigration. Indeed, I would agree that immigration, and the power of assimilation and adaptation, have been an important element of this country's history and development. Immigrants have provided both an energetic workforce and a vital source of creativity, innovation, and invention. The election of Barack Obama, an African-American with a multi-ethnic heritage, seems a confirmation of this admirable national trait.

However, this American advantage may also be eroding, and even becoming problematic. In the U.S. now, there is growing anti-immigrant sentiment, and one would expect this to increase as the economic downturn continues to bite. While the United States has (almost) always welcomed others to our shores, we have not usually treated them very well once they get here. Hispanics and other minorities, for example, experience much higher levels of poverty and unemployment than Whites, and are much more likely to be stuck with poor schools and inadequate health care.

The U.S. is still a global leader in science, technology and innovation, but even in these areas, the country is losing some of its edge. Over the last two decades, the U.S. has steadily lost its overwhelming global dominance in the production of both patents and scientific journal articles. The decline of American schools has taken a toll on science education, too, with American students often coming in dead last on international tests and competitions in science and math. China produces four times as many engineers as the United States. As other countries like China and India gear up technologically, it seems likely that talented and creative people are more likely to stay at home, or return home after taking some education in the United States.

Of course the U.S. remains a major global player in science, technology and innovation. But its ''American Century'' dominance in this area, as in so many others, is on the wane in the face of both domestic decline and the ''rise of the rest.'' Similar to Joseph Nye's emphasis on culture, Madhav Nalapat stresses the ''arts and sciences'' as a powerful tool for the U.S., especially in its interaction with China. And this is where I most differ with Dr. Nalapat. While culture and scientific exchanges are important, they can not substitute for the much more overwhelming influence of trade and economics. This is where China (and the EU, and India) are really gaining, and where the U.S. is particularly vulnerable. It is the growing economic might and confidence of these powers, and others that will most challenge the dominance of the United States.

Russia Hosts and Promotes Emerging Power Groups

This month, Russia hosted back-to-back meetings of two organizations representing “emerging powers” on the global scene. The first of the two, both held in Yekaterinburg, was a meeting of the heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is made up of Russia, China and the four central Asian states (and former Soviet republics) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2006, Iran, India, Pakistan and Mongolia were inducted as observer states and expected to become full members soon. The presidents of the four observer countries, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, were all in attendance at the Yekaterinburg meeting. (When the U.S. originally applied for observer status at the SCO, it was turned down).

As I mention in Chapter 9 (“America’s New Rivals”), the SCO is nominally an alliance of “good neighborliness and friendly cooperation” but many observers see it as a counterbalance to NATO and perhaps to the EU. In 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed a long-term goal of turning the organization into a free trade area, reminiscent of the early phases of the EU.

The alliance already includes countries occupying three-fifths of the Eurasian landmass, and an expansion that would bring together China, Russia, India and Iran would be an imposing global force. Furthermore, it would bring together some of the world’s major oil reserves in Iran, Russia and the Caspian Sea. Some analysts see a strategic and economic effort among these countries to reduce the U.S. hold on the region’s energy resources. China and India, as the world’s fastest-growing energy consumers, may want to secure central Asia’s energy resources for their own economies. Iran and Russia, two of the world’s largest energy suppliers, want to reduce their dependence on sales to the West.

The idea of challenging Western (and especially U.S.) global dominance was evident in the communiqué from the meeting—The Yekaterinburg Declaration—which proclaimed that

“the tendency towards true multipolarity is irreversible. There is a growing significance of the regional aspect in settling global problems.”

Russia’s long-expressed opposition to “unilateralism” and “unipolarity” is a not-so-subtle swipe at the United States. Moscow’s preference for alternate configurations was evident in a second meeting in Yekaterinburg, right after the SCO assembly. This was the inaugural summit of the so-called “BRIC” countries—the emerging economic powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Russian president Dmitry Medvedev was perhaps guilty of hyperbole in calling the summit “the epicenter of world politics” but there is no doubt this is a formidable foursome. According to The Economist, the BRIC’s share of world output leapt from 16% in 2000 to 22% last year. For the last decade, GDP growth in the BRICs has outpaced that of the world, and of emerging and developing economies (see The Economist charts above). These four countries alone control about 40 percent of global currency reserves.

During the summit, the leaders talked about assuming more say in global policy-making; reforming the International Monetary Fund; and a plan to switch some of their foreign currency reserves out of dollars and into IMF bonds (an idea which is also the subject of much discussion in China). As the New York Times observed, the BRIC summit was

“intended to underscore the rising economic clout of these four major developing countries and their demand for a greater voice in the world. And Russia, the group’s host and ideological provocateur, is especially interested in using the summit to fire a shot across Washington’s bow.”