Seven Reasons Not To Despair (too much) about a Trump Presidency

1.  The institution shapes the person.  The Presidency is, literally, an awesome institution, as is the White House.  It will shape and temper Trump, as we saw already with his deferential and respectful meeting with the President there.

2.  Governing, unlike running a business, requires compromise.  Truman famously said of Eisenhower winning the presidency: "he'll sit here, and He'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen.  Poor Ike--it won't be a bit like the Army.  He'll find it very frustrating."  The same will be true for Trump, a business executive who, to say the least, is not experienced at compromise.

3.  Bureaucracies, made up mostly of career civil servants, are slow-moving things, and can often stymie chief executives.  Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK complained about how slowly things moved in the State and Defense Departments.  It will be difficult for Trump to do much of anything quickly.

4.  The Presidency is a tough job and a lot of work.  Presidents are presented with thick daily briefing binders every day.  Trump does not like to read.

5.  Besides all of these other annoyances, Trump is likely to be bedeviled by numerous legal issues, unlike any past President.  There are some 75 lawsuits pending against him right now, and he has been involved in some 3500 over the course of his career.

6.  Trump has already achieved his principal goal--which was simply to win.  He has never in his life ever exhibited any interest in helping other people:  indeed, he did not contribute any of his own money even to his own charitable foundation, which was used mostly as a tax dodge.  So what more does he have to prove, now that he has won the biggest prize in the world?

7.  Managing the Presidency will be frustrating for Trump, a man who is impetuous, temperamental, imperious, and self centered.  My guess is that he will not last four years in the White House.  Either he will resign in frustration, turn over the management of the Presidency to Mike Pence, or be impeached.

So take heart, Democrats!  Maybe all is not lost!

The Age of Uncertainty

These are unsettling times.  Lately we have been witness to a continuing carnival of a presidential election, a series of horrific terrorist attacks and massacres both here and abroad, plus the British Brexit vote.  People here, and in other countries, are unsettled and uncertain.  Indeed, the world is unsettled and uncertain.  In this country, the appeal of Donald Trump is baffling in many ways, but it is also understandable, given the wrenching changes underway in people's lives, and in the world, and the fear and uncertainty that this occasions. This kind of disruption, fear and uncertainty often leads people to seek simple solutions, scapegoats and demagogues.

The reasons behind all this uncertainty are the large-scale shifts in the world, and in the U.S. role in the world.  I call these "systemic changes" and I want to focus on the two most important ones:  first, the decline of the United States as the single dominant and determining global power; and second, the rise of transnational forces and threats that diminish the autonomy and power of ALL nation states, including the U.S.  We are no longer in control of events, either in our own back yard, or on the global stage, and this is discomfiting. 

First let me address the issue of the change of the U.S. role in the world.  Eight years ago, I wrote a book called "The End of the American Century" which addressed this phenomenon.  "The American Century," basically the second half of the 20th century was one of unprecedented global dominance by a single country, the United States.  This was evident in almost every sphere: politics, economics, the military, ideology, and culture.   The Soviet Union, our only real rival during that time, was strong militarily but not in any other respect.  Its standard of living by most measures was about a tenth of that in the U.S., something I can attest to from living in that country briefly in the 1970s

Even in the long course of history, it is rare to find countries or empires that so dominated the world: one thinks only of the Roman Empire or, maybe, the British Empire.  But all empires fade eventually.  Italy and Britain may be very pleasant places to live (and visit!) right now, but they are not the dominant powers they once were.  Something similar is happening to the United States.  This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it contributes to uncertainty.

For the U.S., it is not so much that we have suffered absolute decline, but rather have declined relative to other forces and countries.  The U.S still has the strongest military, the biggest economy, and the most durable and resilient political system.  But we no longer dominate the world as we did during the American Century.  China, for example, has experienced fabulous economic growth in recent decades, and is increasingly asserting itself on the global stage.  Europe, by combining, sort of, into the European Union has created an economic powerhouse, larger than the American one.  Neither China nor the EU is much of a military power just yet, but increasingly it seems that military power is not as useful and determinate as it once was.  Plus, as I will discuss below,  there are transnational forces that also cut into America's ability to shape the world.  So for Americans used to being #1, this relative decline can be unsettling, and speaks to the appeal of Trump's "America First" slogan.

So the relative decline of the U.S. in the global arena is the first major dimension of systemic change.  The other is the rise of transnationalism.  By transnational, I mean problems, forces, movements or institutions that transcend national boundaries, making them difficult for national governments to deal with.   These are proliferating in the modern world, but I will highlight those that have contributed especially to this age of uncertainty:  globalization of the economy; terrorism; and climate change.

Perhaps none of these merit my attention, since they've been so much in the news, and in the current electoral campaign.  Both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders complained about the maverick status of multinational corporations.  As transnational institutions, these can easily shift operations from one country to another in search of cheaper labor or supplies, while remaining relatively immune from the regulations or taxation of government in any particular country.  Of course, a globalized economy does have its benefits, in terms of more efficient production and cheaper and more abundant consumer goods.  But it also hurts those workers who get left behind.  This is particularly true in manufacturing, which has faced a double whammy of automation and globalization, causing jobs in manufacturing to plunge from 28% of all jobs in 1970 to less than 10% today.  The problem is not going to go away.  The shrinking of manufacturing employment is global--not just in the U.S.

Globalization, automation and the decline of manufacturing have contributed to a stagnation of real earnings in the U.S.  For the average American family, household income is $4,000 less than it was 15 years ago.  Meanwhile economic inequality has grown much worse, with the top 1 percent of American households taking in more than half of the recent gains in income growth. Income and wealth inequality in the United States is now the highest it has been since before the Great Depression of the 1930s, as Bernie Sanders kept reminding us during his own run for the presidency. 

This issue is particularly egregious at the very top of the income scale.  In the 1950s, big-company CEOs earned about fifty times the pay of an average worker.  Even then, that ratio was very high compared to other countries.  But since then, CEO pay in the U.S. has skyrocketed compared to average salaries.  By 1990, average CEO pay was 100 times the average worker's salary.  By 2000, it was more than 500 times.  In Germany, that ratio was only 11 to 1; and in the United Kingdom, 25 to 1.

So it is not surprising that so many people are fearful and angry.  Even though the economy is growing, they are being left behind.  The dislocations caused by globalization though, can only be addressed by collective action, and that requires action by government, and cooperation among national governments.  A weak and ineffective government is no match for the power of large multinational corporations.

Terrorism is another transnational force that has frightened and destabilized us.  It often seems that governments are helpless in the face of this enemy, which is not located in any one region, supported by any particular country, or subject to any conventional norms of morality.   Social media, another transnational force, facilitates the organization, recruitment and concealment of terrorist groups.  Against transnational terrorists, particularly the fundamentalist brand, deterrence and threats are useless, and even conventional military force is only haphazardly effective.  America's vaunted military, the most awesome in the history of the world, is not by itself able to eliminate transnational terrorism.  This too causes fear and uncertainty, and a sense of powerlessness.  But, like the forces of globalization, the solution requires global action and cooperation.

Climate change, another transnational phenomenon, is even more threatening and dangerous than globalization and terrorism, though more baffling because of its inherent invisibility.  Even though the evidence for climate change is overwhelming and irrefutable, most people don't actually see it or experience it.  So they are open to the blandishments of politicians and the fossil fuel industry who prey on their ignorance and fears in claiming it does not exist.  And this contributes to our national sense of unease and uncertainty, since we are not sure what to believe and whom to trust.  Climate change, however, is literally a life-and-death issue that requires strong government action, national sacrifice and global cooperation.  All of these are difficult to imagine in the current political climate in the United States.

These transnational phenomena--globalization, terrorism and climate change-- all threaten the American way of life, and they are devilishly resistant to resolution in the way we have solved problems in the past.  Throwing money at them won't work.  Military power is either irrelevant or ineffectual.  Things have changed since The American Century when our country was, it seemed, both dominant and in control of our fate.  In both the domestic sphere and the international one, things are not like they used to be.  Thus appear opportunistic politicians who promise to roll back the clock, or to "make America great again."

However, America's greatness was never achieved by going back to the past, but rather by finding solutions to new problems, while holding fast to the values that unite us.  These include industry, innovation and individualism, but also compassion, tolerance, and civility.  The U.S. has survived through civil war, world wars, depressions, civil unrest and terrorism.  And we remain the world's oldest and most successful democracy; even if we do not brandish the power and influence we had during the Cold War years.

But we have created a kind of paradox of political life: at a time when we are in desperate need of effective government to address important domestic and international issues, government is increasingly unable to act. Democratic government is not often consensual, but it does, by its very nature, require compromise.  But in American politics, we have one candidate calling for a "political revolution" and another, a billionaire cloaked as a populist, calling for a return to the past and playing on people's fears, angers, and prejudice.  The polarization of American politics has made compromise almost unattainable, and in the process has practically paralyzed the operations of government.

Of course, this simply adds to people's frustration with politics and government, which accounts for polls showing record low levels of trust in the federal government.  This is not a happy situation for a system of government that is supposed to be based on popular will.  And it contributes to the turmoil, alienation, and uncertainty.

Keeping this democracy alive is, in my mind, the single biggest challenge we face at the moment and the key to addressing the systemic transformations we are facing.   In the current political environment, the bedrock principles of democracy--compromise, tolerance, participation, inclusion--are under threat.  There is a disturbing growth of authoritarianism in American political culture, with 44% of non-college grads (in 2011) approving of "having a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with Congress or elections."

The growing authoritarianism in the U.S. may be disturbing, but it is not terribly surprising.  Times of systemic change, fear and uncertainty, especially combined with economic downturn, often foster the emergence of demagogic politicians, and even dictators.  It is also understandable why so many Americans are lashing out at the whole system, given the vast gulf between rich and poor, the continuing pernicious impact of money in politics, and the seeming paralysis of government.

The solution is not to reject the system, but to improve it.  As Winston Churchill famously quipped: "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others."  And democracy is uniquely suited to dealing with problems that are so complex and disruptive, because it demands participation, inclusion, compromise, respect for minorities, and due process.  The problems we are facing are unprecedented, in my view, and signal a systemic shift in U.S. politics and international relations.  The U.S. will not be "great" in the way we were before, but it remains the most important and admired country in the world, and it's involvement in global politics is indispensible.

(Based on a talk I gave at a Kiwanis Club 8/30/16)

Der Spiegel on "A Superpower in Decline"

Sometimes the most clear-eyed analysis of the United States comes from outside the country, and this may be especially true in these times when so many Americans are frightened and angry about the way things are going. Germany's weekly newsmagazine Der Spiegel has published a long and thoughtful piece about the United States, entitled "A Superpower in Decline: Is the American Dream Over?" which reflects and updates many of the themes I raised in The End of the American Century.

For those who would dismiss Spiegel's analysis as biased, left-wing, or "socialist," I should point out that the magazine is generally considered to have a conservative (and capitalist!) slant. It is enlightening, and a little sobering, to read an intelligent analysis of our problems from outside the cauldron of contemporary U.S. politics.

Below are a few excerpts from the Spiegel article, though I would encourage everyone to read the whole thing.

• America has long been a country of limitless possibility. But the dream has now become a nightmare for many. The US is now realizing just how fragile its success has become -- and how bitter its reality. Should the superpower not find a way out of crisis, it could spell trouble ahead for the global economy.

• Americans have lived beyond their means for decades. It was a culture long defined by a mantra of entitlement, one that promised opportunities for all while ignoring the risks.

• The country is reacting strangely irrationally to the loss of its importance -- it is a reaction characterized primarily by rage. Significant portions of America simply want to return to a supposedly idyllic past.

• The rich keep getting richer, with the top 0.1 percent of income earners making more money than the 120 million people at the bottom of the income scale.

• Since the beginning of the millennium, no new jobs are being created on balance, because the US economy has undergone structural change. Companies are dominated by investors interested only in the kinds of quick and large profits that can be achieved by reducing the workforce.

• In 1978, the average income for men in the United States was $45,879. In 2007, it was $45,113, adjusted for inflation.

• How strong is the cement holding together a society that manically declares any social thinking to be socialist?

• The United States of 2010 is a country that has become paralyzed and inhibited by allowing itself to be distracted by things that are, in reality, not a threat: homosexuality, Mexicans, Democratic Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi, health care reform and Obama.

American Values Contextualize Decline

Caleb Hamman
chamman@butler.edu

Amidst national debate on healthcare, foreign policy, and economics, with news outlets devoting coverage to pundits, officials, and political processes, it is easy to overlook the role of the American citizen in shaping public policy—the popular culpability in US decline.

To the extent American democracy functions democratically (see my earlier post and EAC chapter five), public opinion is an important variable in the furthering or the mitigating of growing challenges. Troubling trends in the American psyche are among the results of the newest study released by the World Values Survey.

The research, spanning more than fifty countries during the past four years, shows considerable divergence between American and world opinion on issues of importance.

Reaffirming The End of the American Century correlation between religious fundamentalism and rejection of science, the survey found that Americans were nearly twice as likely as non-Americans to be active in churches or religious organizations; simultaneously, Americans were 11 percent less likely to consider global warming “very serious” and three times more likely to consider it “not serious at all.”

Gaps also existed in attitude toward security and conflict resolution, reflecting a continued embrace of “hard power” in American political thought, with Americans placing more confidence in the military than non-Americans and placing less confidence in international organizations like the United Nations.

By far, the biggest gulfs between US and global attitude were in the area of economic policy. Here, Americans were much more likely than others to be tolerant of inequality, to disfavor government intervention in the economy, and to believe in the wealth-accumulating potential of hard work and individualism.

The contrast of attitude was particularly striking between the United States and the fifteen European countries surveyed. Europeans were almost twice as likely as Americans to strongly agree that incomes should be made more equal. They were also more likely to view circumstantial factors like luck and wealth as important to getting ahead, and they were much more likely to consider economic redistribution an “essential characteristic of democracy.”

Perhaps the most poignant aspect of the survey results is that they highlight an American disregard for problems the United States is uniquely victim to. Among advanced, industrialized countries, US levels of economic inequality and economic immobility are among those of the worst (see post referenced above, this post, and EAC chapter two). Despite the myriad social and political consequences of US economic problems, Americans appear remarkably misinformed and unconcerned. Meanwhile, the egalitarian measures used elsewhere to alleviate economic ills are revealed by the survey to be anathema in American thought, underscoring the difficulties faced by the current administration in its efforts to restructure the economics of health, taxation, and market regulation.

In discussion of issues like these, and in wider discussions about the rise and fall of international powers, the role of the public consciousness should not be overlooked, for particularly in democracies, popular attitude not only shapes the spectrum of debate, but is itself shaped by the institutions of policy and reform.

Bartels Finds Declining Equality and Influence

Caleb Hamman

chamman@butler.edu

Economic and political inequality are among the most significant aspects of U.S. decline. Both topics are the focus of the most recent work of Princeton Political Scientist Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. In his book, Bartels sets out to analyze the political causes and consequences of economic inequality, arguing that these are both substantial and urgently relevant to alleviating injustice.

Naturally, Bartels begins by assessing the extent to which economic inequality exists in the United States. After detailed review of current literature and government data, Bartels offers findings very much in line with those of The End of the American Century, essentially that “current levels of inequality rival those of the Roaring Twenties,” making it fitting to speak of a “New Gilded Age” or a “retrogression of historic scope.” As Mason points out, this sort of inequality can lead to monstrous disparities, such as CEOs making more than 500 times their average employee, and has effectively caused the United States to become more unequal than “any advanced industrialized country.”

Like The End of the American Century, Bartels finds that current inequality is not a recent phenomenon, but has been growing sharply since the 1970s. Although this observation is generally accepted, Bartels then goes on to make a less mainstream claim—that increasing economic inequality is a largely a result of public policy. While Bartels readily concedes that economic factors like globalization and technology have contributed to inequality, he staunchly refuses to attribute the entire dynamic to arcane “market forces” or inculpable “economic realities.” Rather, a significant role is played by political intervention, an idea Mason also highlights by discussing issues like the “elimination of the federal welfare system” and the “stagnation of the minimum wage.”

Bartels goes one step further. He argues that U.S. economic inequality is “profoundly shaped by partisan politics”—specifically that “middleclass and poor families” have “fared much worse under Republican presidents than they have under Democratic presidents.” This is not necessarily a novel notion, but rarely has it been supported by such detailed analysis. Using exclusively Census Bureau data and controlling for non-partisan variables such as international crisis, Bartels conclusively demonstrates that the incomes of most have grown at substantially higher rates under Democratic presidents than under their Republican counterparts.

After illustrating his findings with three chapter-length case studies, Bartels turns to his second major point—the political consequences of inequality. Here, his research is particularly disturbing. In calculating the recent responsiveness of U.S. Senators to their constituents, Bartels finds that:

Senators’ roll call votes were quite responsive to the ideological views of their middle- and  high-income constituents. In contrast, the views of low-income constituents had no discernible impact on the voting behavior of the senators…the statistical results are quite consistent in suggesting that the opinions of constituents in the bottom third of the income distribution were utterly irrelevant.

Examining the potential causes of this mass political exclusion, Bartels finds that “biases” in “senators’ responsiveness to rich and poor constituents are not primarily due to differences between rich and poor constituents in turnout, political knowledge, or contacting.” Rather, “the data are consistent with the hypothesis that senators represented their campaign contributors to the exclusion of other constituents.” As Mason puts it, “When people do not…contribute to political campaigns, they are less likely to be listened to by legislators or policymakers, and their interests are less likely to be taken into account in the political process.”

In analyzing the totality of his findings, Bartels delivers a particularly sobering assessment:

In Aristotle’s terms, our political system seems to be functioning not as a 'democracy,' but as an 'oligarchy.' If we insist on flattering ourselves by referring to is as a democracy, we should be clear that is a starkly unequal democracy.

Despite such foreboding, Bartels attempts to end with a more hopeful thought: Since inequality has been largely been brought about by conscious political action, there seems to be potential for prescriptive change. As Bartels puts it, “We can make these choices.” But as Mason points out, we are quickly running out of time.

Andrew Bacevich on The Limits of U.S. Power

Andrew Bacevich’s book The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, has much in common with my own book The End of the American Century but is, if anything, even more pessimistic about the outlook for the United States. Bacevich, a retired military officer and currently professor of history and international relations at Boston University, recently visited Butler as part of the Drew Brahos lecture series.

The Limits of Power sees three interrelated crises afflicting the U.S.: the crisis of profligacy; the political crisis; and the military crisis. The guiding ideological light in his book is the early 20th century American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr (who I also quote in my book). During the Cold War, Niebuhr complained about U.S. tendency to hubris and sanctimony, which Bacevich views as even more prevalent now, becoming “the paramount expressions of American statecraft.”

As Bacevich sees it, our failures abroad (including especially the Iraq War) are a function of our unending consumer appetites at home. “The collective capacity of our domestic political economy to satisfy those appetites has not kept pace with demand. As a result, sustaining our pursuit of life, liberty and happiness at home requires increasingly that Americans look beyond our borders. Whether the issue at hand is oil, credit, or the availability of cheap consumer goods, we expect the world to accommodate the American way of life.”

“Centered on consumption and individual autonomy, the exercise of freedom is contributing to the gradual erosion of our national power.”

The Iraq War is just the latest step in the gradual erosion of U.S. power, weakening us both externally and internally as we refuse to face up to our own problems. He includes a wonderfully revealing quote from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from October 2001:

“We have two choices. Either we change the way we live, or we change the way they live. We choose the latter.”

Bacevich is scathingly critical of the American political system, which he sees broken and corrupted by an imperial presidency, a “feckless” Congress, and an incompetent national security structure. Our democracy has been hijacked, he says, by a political elite who “have a vested interest in perpetuating the crises that provide the source of their power.”

These are powerful charges and surprisingly radical, coming from someone who has been part of the establishment and who considers himself a conservative. When Butler faculty and students met with him over breakfast, we raised the question of whether the capitalist system itself was broken, given the arguments he made in his book and his lecture. However, even though he sees little hope for any kind of economic or political recovery in the U.S., Bacevich maintains a firm commitment to capitalism and democracy. Many of us found this to be paradoxical. If the system is broken and can’t be fixed, shouldn’t we be searching for some alternative?

The Limits of Power is a powerful and sobering analysis and critique of the American prospect. The message is similar to that of my book, though there are differences. Bacevich focuses more on the U.S. itself, whereas I link what is happening in the U.S. with broader international and global trends. While both of us decry American consumerism, he focuses more on the cultural (and even spiritual) aspects of this, while I spend more time on the economic and social consequences of it. Neither one of us is terribly optimistic about the outcome, but the last pages of my book offer some inklings of hope, whereas the last paragraph of The Limits of Power is thoroughly downbeat. He quotes, once again, Niebuhr to the effect that social orders inevitably destroy themselves in an effort to prove they are indestructible. “Clinging doggedly to the conviction that the rules to which other nations must submit don’t apply,” concludes Bacevich,

“Americans appear determined to affirm Niebuhr’s axiom of willful self destruction.”

The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (American Empire Project)

Indiana Governor Has "No Idea" of Costs of Commercial Flights

Indiana's Governor Mitch Daniels, using a $1000 per hour state aircraft for a trip to Washington, appeared clueless when a reporter asked him if it might be cheaper to fly commercial and stay an extra night in DC.

Last weekend, Daniels was flying to Washington for the annual meeting of the National Governors Association when the plane developed a crack in one of the windows, forcing it to land in Columbus. He flew on from there on a commercial flight.

The state-owned plane, a King Air prop, costs $791 per hour for fuel plus $184 in maintenance costs for each hour of flying. The flight from Indianapolis to Washington takes about two hours.

According to the Indianapolis Star, when he was asked why he didn't fly commercial in the first place, Daniels said there was no commercial flight that would have gotten him to Washington on time. "I would've had to come the night before and buy a hotel room and I don't know what else." When asked whether it still wouldn't have been cheaper to fly commercial, even if it meant another night in a hotel, Daniels said "I have no idea."

This seems a peculiar response from the former director of the national budget, and a man who President Bush referred to as "The Blade" for his acumen at budget cutting. But even then, Daniels was not so good at keeping spending under control. During his tenure as director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2001 to 2003, the federal budget flipped from a $236 billion surplus to a $400 billion deficit.

So I took the liberty of checking up on prices for the gov. The Governors Association was meeting at the J.W. Marriott hotel in DC. A king size bed on a weekend night costs about $200--though almost certainly the governors attending the conference received a reduced convention rate. A commercial roundtrip flight from Indy to DC--non-stop and at least as fast as flying a smaller turboprop--also runs about $200.

So to fly commercial and stay an extra night would have been roughly $400. To fly the 9-seat King Air, without having to "buy a hotel room and I don't know what else" costs about 2k each way, for a total of $4000. Ten times as much, Mr. Governor.

Maybe this is trivial, but Daniels' cavalier dismissal of the question on costs betrays an arrogance and profligacy that is unbecoming of a public servant. Some of our Congressional representatives have grilled the bailout CEOs about their use of corporate jets. Surely our elected representatives should be held to at least the same standards, particularly in this time of deficits, belt-tightening, and sacrifice.



(Scott Adam's 2/25 "Dilbert" strip.

U.S. Intelligence Predicts Reduced U.S. Dominance

A Washington Post article this week (9/10/08) reports on a forthcoming U.S. intelligence agencies report that “envisions a steady decline in U.S. dominance in the coming decades.” Thomas Finger, a top analyst for the U.S. intelligence community, delivered the preview in a speech in which he saw U.S. global leadership rapidly eroding in “political, economic and arguably, cultural arenas.” The one area of continued U.S. dominance—military power—was becoming increasingly irrelevant as an asset in global power and influence.

These are all themes of The End of the American Century, so should not be terribly surprising, except for the source—the U.S. government itself—and the sweep of the conclusions. It is not just U.S. diplomatic influence that is on the wane, but political, economic, cultural and military leadership as well. The multidimensional and interrelated aspects of U.S. decline are the central theme of my book, but it is startling to hear it expressed so bluntly from the top intelligence analysts of the federal government.

The intelligence report, however, misses a key element of the declining global influence of the U.S.: its domestic weakening. Fingar’s speech saw the decline in U.S. dominance coming from exclusively global trends: globalization, climate change, resource shortages. All of these are important, of course, but the root of America’s declining global influence is here at home. Just as at the global level, the domestic decay is multidimensional—it is political, social and (especially) economic; and affects education, health care, infrastructure, and competitiveness.

The United States has become the world’s largest debtor, and the governments of other countries are increasingly worried about the scope and scale of U.S. debt and fiscal weaknesses. Even the International Monetary Fund, normally concerned about debt and insolvency in Third World countries, has warned that the continuing large budget deficits of the U.S pose “a significant threat for the rest of the world.” Other countries are beginning to turn away from the United States, both for investments and for global economic leadership, and are increasingly abandoning the dollar as the favored international currency. This is one reason for the sharp and steady decline of the dollar compared to the euro and other international currencies.

In many other respects, as well, the United States is no longer seen as the standard for emulation by other countries. The U.S. has among the highest rates of both poverty and inequality in the developed world. This poverty and inequality contribute to highly uneven access to health care, so the U.S. ranks near the bottom of developed countries in most measures of health and medical care. Even our vaunted democracy, the “beacon on the hill” for centuries, is now so dominated by money and special interests that it is rarely cited by other countries as a model for political development. Global public opinion polls in the past showed foreign populations skeptical and wary of the U.S. government; increasingly now they reveal negativity toward the U.S. population, and even to U.S. ideals. All aspects of American “soft power” are withering away.

The Fingar report, like Fareed Zakaria’s new book The Post-American World, sees this global shift coming because of “the rise of the rest”—global powerhouses like China, India and Brazil that increasingly cut into the U.S. lead on the world stage. Zakaria asserts, indeed, that the shift is not about the decline of America, and writes about the many elements of this country’s continuing strength. Solidly within the U.S. establishment, both of these analyses ignore the sand shifting beneath their own feet. Only by confronting and addressing our own domestic weaknesses and problems can we begin to solve our international ones.