Entering A Systemic Revolution

The collapse of the United States as the global hegemon constitutes a “systemic revolution” that will transform both the U.S. and the rest of the globe. Such a revolution is different from “normal” political revolutions, which entail an overthrow of the government. A systemic revolution ushers in even broader and more enduring changes in economy, society and culture, and it also transcends national boundaries, affecting other countries and the global system itself. It is a global paradigm shift, and we are right smack in the middle of it.

This is the opening paragraph of my article "Entering a Systemic Revolution" which appears in the online journal Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture (volume 8, issue 2). The article can be accessed here through my Selected Works page.

The article is a revised version of a lecture I gave in March at a conference on "The Past and Future of Revolutions" at Northeastern Illinois University.

In the article, I compare the current global situation to previous "systemic revolutions", among them the French Revolution of 1789, the Industrial Revolution, the Darwinian Revolution, and the anti-communist revolutions of 1989. Like those epochal changes, the domestic and international decline of the U.S. will affect both the United States and the rest of the world, and will bring fundamental and global changes in politics, economics, culture, and ideology.

Ovation, Inc.: Speakers on Issues That Matter

I am now involved in a speaker's agency, Ovation, Inc., that is "a small but highly selective agency representing an array of affordable speakers addressing pressing issues of our time." Many of the issues raised in The End of the American Century, and on this blog, are topics available for lectures, classes, workshops, etc. by me and other experts on the Ovation roster. Take a look at the site at www.ovationagency.com.

Can America Fail?

In its spring 2009 issue, The Wilson Quarterly featured a series of articles entitled "Decline or Renewal?" addressing the "scenarios for postcrisis America." The lead article, "Can America Fail?" was written by Kishore Mahbubani of the National University of Singapore, and the author of The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (2009). The subtitle of that article is "A sympathetic critic issues a wake-up call for an America mired in groupthink and blind to its own shortcomings" which, in my mind, is also a pretty accurate description of yours truly!

Mahbubani believes that the U.S. has been "engulfed by a culture of individual irresponsibility" and sees many of the country's policies as deeply injurious to the rest of the world. Our policies on the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq, our double standard on nuclear proliferation, and our policies (or lack of them) on global warming "have injured the 6.5 billion other people who inhabit the world." Mahbubani thinks Americans need to be able to see our country the way others see us, to recognize and address our own shortcomings, and to be prepared to work harder, consumer less, and--especially--to sacrifice.

The two other essays in the Wilson Quarterly are a counterpoint to Mahbubani's article, but also illustrate exactly the problem Mahbubani addresses: Americans "mired in groupthink" and blind to their own shortcomings. The article by Tyler Cowen, Professor of Economics at George Mason University, asserts (without any evidence provided) that "today, the rest of the world is looking to the United States to pull it out of a recession." He also asserts, astoundingly, that the current financial crisis "has underscored the continuing strength of American global influence." Equally questionable, and more fodder for Mahbubani's observations, is Arthur Herman's assertion that "America is still the most innovative and creative economy in the world."

The editors of The Wilson Quarterly invited me to submit a response to these three articles, and a version of the following appeared in their "Letters" section in the Summer 2009 issue (page 6).

.............................
On the question of U.S. decline, Kishore Mahbubani hits the nail on the head by pointing to the inability of American thinkers and policy-makers “to listen to other voices on the planet.” Indeed, his point is illustrated by the contributions by others in the same issue who seem to assume that other countries want the U.S. to lead and who believe that the American economy is still the most dynamic in the world.

If one simply asks other people in the world what they think, these casual assumptions wither away. Global opinion surveys conducted by Pew, BBC and others show little enthusiasm in other countries for “American-style democracy,” for American ways of doing business, or for the spread of U.S. ideas and customs. Though global opinion about the U.S. has improved somewhat with the election of President Obama, far more people worldwide continue to see U.S. influence on the world as “mostly negative” rather than “mostly positive.” On this scale, among 15 countries, the U.S. ranks 10th, below Germany, Britain, Japan and China, according to a recent BBC poll.

It is difficult to see how the U.S. economy could be seen as so vital, innovative and creative at a time when the core parts of it are collapsing under the weight of innovative stagnation and stupefying levels of incompetence, greed, corruption. Manufacturing has steadily declined as a component of GDP, replaced increasingly by financial services. The U.S. does not actually produce much any more. Now the financial sector has proven a hollow shell, after fostering and encouraging record levels of both consumer spending and debt. This can no longer be sustained, so the U.S. economy is bound to decline, and probably by a lot. As Professor Mahbubani astutely points out, “the time has come for Americans to spend less and work harder.”

New Global Powers Emerge From Crisis: Shanghai Daily Interview

I was interviewed in Shanghai by Joyce Pan for The Shanghai Daily, an English-language newspaper in China's largest city. Entitled "New Global Powers Emerge From Crisis," the interview focussed on the impact of America's economic crisis on China and other "rising powers." On the same page is an interview with French actress Isabelle Huppert, which should add to the number of hits that this blog gets!

Shanghai Daily Interview

American Values Contextualize Decline

Caleb Hamman
chamman@butler.edu

Amidst national debate on healthcare, foreign policy, and economics, with news outlets devoting coverage to pundits, officials, and political processes, it is easy to overlook the role of the American citizen in shaping public policy—the popular culpability in US decline.

To the extent American democracy functions democratically (see my earlier post and EAC chapter five), public opinion is an important variable in the furthering or the mitigating of growing challenges. Troubling trends in the American psyche are among the results of the newest study released by the World Values Survey.

The research, spanning more than fifty countries during the past four years, shows considerable divergence between American and world opinion on issues of importance.

Reaffirming The End of the American Century correlation between religious fundamentalism and rejection of science, the survey found that Americans were nearly twice as likely as non-Americans to be active in churches or religious organizations; simultaneously, Americans were 11 percent less likely to consider global warming “very serious” and three times more likely to consider it “not serious at all.”

Gaps also existed in attitude toward security and conflict resolution, reflecting a continued embrace of “hard power” in American political thought, with Americans placing more confidence in the military than non-Americans and placing less confidence in international organizations like the United Nations.

By far, the biggest gulfs between US and global attitude were in the area of economic policy. Here, Americans were much more likely than others to be tolerant of inequality, to disfavor government intervention in the economy, and to believe in the wealth-accumulating potential of hard work and individualism.

The contrast of attitude was particularly striking between the United States and the fifteen European countries surveyed. Europeans were almost twice as likely as Americans to strongly agree that incomes should be made more equal. They were also more likely to view circumstantial factors like luck and wealth as important to getting ahead, and they were much more likely to consider economic redistribution an “essential characteristic of democracy.”

Perhaps the most poignant aspect of the survey results is that they highlight an American disregard for problems the United States is uniquely victim to. Among advanced, industrialized countries, US levels of economic inequality and economic immobility are among those of the worst (see post referenced above, this post, and EAC chapter two). Despite the myriad social and political consequences of US economic problems, Americans appear remarkably misinformed and unconcerned. Meanwhile, the egalitarian measures used elsewhere to alleviate economic ills are revealed by the survey to be anathema in American thought, underscoring the difficulties faced by the current administration in its efforts to restructure the economics of health, taxation, and market regulation.

In discussion of issues like these, and in wider discussions about the rise and fall of international powers, the role of the public consciousness should not be overlooked, for particularly in democracies, popular attitude not only shapes the spectrum of debate, but is itself shaped by the institutions of policy and reform.

Russia Hosts and Promotes Emerging Power Groups

This month, Russia hosted back-to-back meetings of two organizations representing “emerging powers” on the global scene. The first of the two, both held in Yekaterinburg, was a meeting of the heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is made up of Russia, China and the four central Asian states (and former Soviet republics) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2006, Iran, India, Pakistan and Mongolia were inducted as observer states and expected to become full members soon. The presidents of the four observer countries, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, were all in attendance at the Yekaterinburg meeting. (When the U.S. originally applied for observer status at the SCO, it was turned down).

As I mention in Chapter 9 (“America’s New Rivals”), the SCO is nominally an alliance of “good neighborliness and friendly cooperation” but many observers see it as a counterbalance to NATO and perhaps to the EU. In 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed a long-term goal of turning the organization into a free trade area, reminiscent of the early phases of the EU.

The alliance already includes countries occupying three-fifths of the Eurasian landmass, and an expansion that would bring together China, Russia, India and Iran would be an imposing global force. Furthermore, it would bring together some of the world’s major oil reserves in Iran, Russia and the Caspian Sea. Some analysts see a strategic and economic effort among these countries to reduce the U.S. hold on the region’s energy resources. China and India, as the world’s fastest-growing energy consumers, may want to secure central Asia’s energy resources for their own economies. Iran and Russia, two of the world’s largest energy suppliers, want to reduce their dependence on sales to the West.

The idea of challenging Western (and especially U.S.) global dominance was evident in the communiqué from the meeting—The Yekaterinburg Declaration—which proclaimed that

“the tendency towards true multipolarity is irreversible. There is a growing significance of the regional aspect in settling global problems.”

Russia’s long-expressed opposition to “unilateralism” and “unipolarity” is a not-so-subtle swipe at the United States. Moscow’s preference for alternate configurations was evident in a second meeting in Yekaterinburg, right after the SCO assembly. This was the inaugural summit of the so-called “BRIC” countries—the emerging economic powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Russian president Dmitry Medvedev was perhaps guilty of hyperbole in calling the summit “the epicenter of world politics” but there is no doubt this is a formidable foursome. According to The Economist, the BRIC’s share of world output leapt from 16% in 2000 to 22% last year. For the last decade, GDP growth in the BRICs has outpaced that of the world, and of emerging and developing economies (see The Economist charts above). These four countries alone control about 40 percent of global currency reserves.

During the summit, the leaders talked about assuming more say in global policy-making; reforming the International Monetary Fund; and a plan to switch some of their foreign currency reserves out of dollars and into IMF bonds (an idea which is also the subject of much discussion in China). As the New York Times observed, the BRIC summit was

“intended to underscore the rising economic clout of these four major developing countries and their demand for a greater voice in the world. And Russia, the group’s host and ideological provocateur, is especially interested in using the summit to fire a shot across Washington’s bow.”

Why is "The End of the American Century" Important to China?

Professor Ni Lexiong, who was the lead translator for The End of the American Century, has written this note, in Chinese, on how he came to know about the book and why he thought it should be translated and published in Chinese. The financial crisis, he writes, makes it even more urgent that people in China read the book.

-------------------
《美国世纪的终结》译后记


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2009-4-20 12:55:34 倪乐雄 　 来源：易文网

2008年11月中旬，上海大学历史系徐有威教授告知，他的朋友、美国巴特勒大学政治系韩孝荣教授向他推荐了梅森教授最新出版的《美国世纪的终结》，我很快与梅森先生取得了联系，得知这本书刚出版几个星期，在美国已产生一定影响。书中一些观点虽然也在各种文章中能够见到，但如此全面、深入、系统地探讨美国的衰落，并且观点十分鲜明的专著却鲜有见到，梅森教授的著作可谓弥补了这一缺憾。
在这本书里，梅森教授从一个宏观的视野描绘了美国正在历史性地衰退的图景。其理论依据是保罗·肯尼迪关于“帝国过度扩张导致衰退”的观点，这种观点提供的历史模式是：一个帝国为扩张和维持自己的势力范围，必然会把国力消耗在巨大的军事投入上，从而使国家首先陷入经济衰退，继而不可避免地导致政治和军事上的衰退。肯尼迪认为任何历史上的大国都无法回避这一模式，包括美国。梅森教授所做的工作就是试图证明今天的美国已经进入“帝国衰退的历史模式”，他的研究思路是沿着“国防开支——赤字”和“债务——经济危机——社会全面危机和衰退”这样走下来的。
美国“次贷危机”迅速引发了世界经济大危机，对目前和未来将产生重大影响，在这种时刻将此书译成中文，介绍给国内读者很有必要。因为今天的中国和美国似乎都已不由自主地来到了历史转折点上，秉性刚直的梅森教授非常了解自己的国家，并有独到的细致观察和慎密分析。他判定美国的历史性衰退已经不可避免地来到了，而且就是现在，美国政府和人民必须做好调整心态和姿态的准备。这一预言家式的断言，无论将来能否验证，都值得我们关注。
此书的翻译得到上海辞书出版社上官消波副总编和吴雅仙女士的鼎力支持，在征得梅森教授意见和上海辞书出版社同意后，立即开始了本书的翻译工作。具体分工是：倪乐雄序言、中文版序、导言、第1章，孙运峰第2章、第3章，南琳第4章，陈道银第5章，赵雅丹第6章、第10章，熊曙光第7章，王立中第8章，周晓华第9章。孙运峰负责全书的统稿和部分校对，吴雅仙女士负责本书译稿的校订和编辑工作。
此书的出版也得到渥太华中国事务研究院(The China Research Institute of Ottawa)和姜留义女士的支持，在此表示感谢。

倪乐雄
2009年2月18日于上海寓中